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The tax-welfare mix: explaining Japan’s
weak extractive capacity
Gene Park and Eisaku Ide

Abstract Despite having the highest level of public debt in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), higher than Greece or Italy,
Japan has one of the lowest aggregate tax burdens of the advanced industrial
democracies. This paper asks why Japan, once described as a strong developmental
state, has had such a weak extractive capacity, an inability to raise revenues to
confront deficits and public debt? In contrast to the existing explanations that
focus on political institutions, partisan preferences, or economic globalization, this
article argues that Japan’s ‘tax welfare mix’
the combination of taxes and
redistributive welfare polices
undermined the state’s long-term capacity to
secure adequate tax revenue. More than just a source of revenue, taxes can be used
directly to achieve redistributive goals, such as targeting low taxes and exemptions
to specific groups. This study shows how Japan’s tax welfare mix diminished
its extractive capacity through three mechanisms: the political lock-in of a
redistributive social bargain struck around low taxes, the timing and sequencing of
its tax policy and welfare development, and the erosion of public trust, which
undermined tax consent. Beyond offering a new theory of extractive capacity, the
tax welfare mix explains aspects of Japan’s tax structure that defy existing
explanations and contributes to our understanding of the capitalist development
state by highlighting the redistributive political function of tax policy and its longterm impact on state capacity.
Keywords taxes; welfare state; developmental state; public debt; budget deficits;
Japan

Gene Park is Associate Professor at Loyola Marymount University. He has researched and
written extensively on the politics of public finance in Japan, including a book entitled Spending without Taxation: FILP and the Politics of Public Finance in Japan (Stanford University
Press, 2011). He is currently working on a comparative study of taxation and a comparative
study of fiscal consolidation.
Address: Department of Political Science, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA,
USA. Email: gene.park@lmu.edu
Eisaku Ide is Associate Professor at Keio University (Japan).He is an expert on Japanese fiscal and financial policy. He has published numerous books on Japan’s budgetary and monetary policy, including A Study on Takahashi Economic Policy (Yuhikaku, 2006) and Fiscal
Sociology of the Central Bank (Chisen Shokan, 2006). Now he is focusing on the development
of the Japanese welfare state in the postwar era.
Address: Department of Economics, Keio University, Minato, Japan. Email: ask_ide@econ.
keio.ac.jp
Ó 2014 Taylor & Francis

676

The Pacific Review

Introduction
After nearly two decades of research on the capitalist developmental state,
a growing body of work has focused on the welfare state in East Asia
(Aspalter, 2006; Holliday, 2000; Kim, 2010; Kwon, 2005, 2007; Lee and Ku,
2007). This work has sought to determine if there is in fact a distinctive
East Asian welfare regime in addition to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three
worlds of welfare. Much of this work concludes that there is an East Asian
model characterized by low welfare spending, an emphasis on family, priority on work, and other characteristics (Aspalter, 2006; Holliday, 2000;
Kim, 2010; Kwon, 2005, 2007; Lee and Ku, 2007). The shift to social policy
has been a useful corrective to the preoccupation with industrial policy
during the 1980s and 1990s. While offering the potential to better explain
the politics of social protection in East Asian states, this work has not
always escaped the shadow of the earlier work on the developmental state.
Holliday (2000) and Kwon (2005), for instance, have viewed the nature of
East Asian welfare as a function of strong developmental states that have
prioritized economic growth over social policy. Thus, East Asian welfare
states have been described as ‘productivist welfare regimes’ and
‘developmental welfare states’. Low welfare spending and weak social
rights have been equated with the prerogatives of the developmental state.
Thus, the presumption of strong states persists, even though some of recent
scholarship on the developmental state calls into question its contemporary
relevance (for a review, see Stubbs, 2009).
The case of Japan highlights these contradictions. Although the Japanese state moderated welfare expenditures to pursue developmental goals,
the Japanese state has shown weakness in other areas, very strikingly in
the area of public finance. Japan is now the most indebted country in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with
higher gross debt than even Greece. Japan’s bank bailouts during the
1990s and slow economic growth contributed to Japan’s growing public
debt, but even controlling for economic sluggishness, the government has
run chronic structural deficits. Moreover, the Japanese state has been surprisingly weak vis-
a-vis societal interests, trying but failing to raise adequate revenue, even though Japan has one of the lowest aggregate tax
burdens of the industrialized democracies. While the Japanese government
passed legislation in the summer of 2012 to raise the consumption tax from
5% to 10%, estimates suggest that the rate would have to rise to
17% 31% just to stabilize debt (Hoshi and Takatoshi, 2012). Moreover,
the party that raised the tax suffered a resounding defeat and loss of power
in December 2012 that has reinforced the view that tax hikes are electorally perilous. If a strong developmental state is one insulated from a weak
society (Stubbs, 2009), then the Japanese state has been exceedingly weak
when it comes to raising revenue. How can we explain Japan’s weak
extractive capacity?

G. Park and E. Ide: The Tax-Welfare Mix

677

This paper shows, in contrast to the view of the ‘developmental welfare
state’, that Japan’s weakness on the extractive side actually stems from its
model of social policy, specifically its ‘tax welfare mix’. In principle, states
can use taxes either as source of revenue for spending or more directly to
achieve redistributive goals. In Japan, the government combined limited
welfare spending with a redistributive tax policy and high levels of public
investment after World War II. This specific tax welfare mix initially
helped the government keep expenditures low, but over the long-term,
weakened extractive capacity by making it harder to broaden its tax base
even as Japan moved to enhance its welfare policies.
The next section provides an overview of Japan’s weak extractive capacity and highlights some of the limitations of the existing explanations. The
paper then outlines Japan’s specific tax welfare mix that the government
established after Japan’s defeat in World War II and remained largely in
place through the 1960s. The remainder of the paper, employing a historical institutionalist approach (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011; Pierson, 2004;
Thelen, 2004), explains how Japan’s tax welfare-mix ‘locked-in’ weak
extractive capacity through three mechanisms. First, the government’s use
of low taxes to achieve social goals became entrenched politically through
interest group pressure, norms, and partisan competition. Second, the timing and sequencing of tax and social policy inhibited the government’s
attempt to raise revenue. In contrast to other industrialized democracies,
the government deliberately chose to keep the tax burden low during a
period of rapid economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, the
government moved to increase taxes when globalization and growing tax
competition created downward pressure on taxes in the 1980s. The government did succeed in raising social security contributions, which tend to
incur less opposition due to the tight link with the welfare state, but welfare
retrenchment during the 1980s and 1990s hampered the government’s
effort to shift its tax base toward greater regressive taxation of consumption as tax competition produced downward pressure on taxation of corporate and personal income. Third, Japan’s tax welfare mix, which relied on
heavy public investment and targeted taxes, fed a perception of an unfair
tax burden and wasteful public spending that eroded public trust and tax
consent, creating a systematic preference for cutting spending over tax
hikes.

Japan’s weak extractive capacity
While less striking since the Great Recession that has damaged the public
finances of many countries, Japan’s fiscal situation is outstanding for its
chronic deficits and high levels of accumulated debt. Japan’s current budget relies on bonds for nearly half of its revenue, and Japan has had budget
deficits for nearly every year for the last 20 years. It is now the most
indebted country in the OECD with gross debt in Japan in 2011 at 233.1%
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of GDP; by comparison, Greece’s was 165.6% (IMF, 2011). Even accounting for the Japanese government’s assets, Japan’s net debt too is highest in
the OECD at 130.6% of GDP (IMF, 2011). This state of affairs is remarkable for a country that through the mid-1960s was one of the leanest and
most fiscally disciplined.
Despite high debt, structural budget deficits, and a demographic profile
(an old and rapidly aging population with low fertility) that will drive up
government expenditures and shrink the tax base, the government has had
difficulty raising revenue even though aggregate taxes are low. In fact,
much of the postwar Japan had the lowest aggregate tax burden of the
industrialized democracies, and only recently has it traded places with Australia and the USA for that distinction. As Figure 1 illustrates, while the
government has stabilized its level of spending, even as its aging population
has driven up social security expenditures, the government has not been
able to raise adequate revenue.
The Japanese government’s weak extractive capacity is surprising given
the view of Japan as a strong capitalist developmental state (Johnson,
1982; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Moreover, while Campbell and Allen (1994)
have found fiscal challenges or ‘state imperatives’ to be correlated with
increases in income taxes in the USA, such imperatives have had weak
effects on Japan’s extractive capacity.
Japan’s weak extractive capacity is also surprising in light of the fact that
Japan has been long-ruled by a center-right party, the Liberal Democratic

Figure 1 Japan’s revenue gap (in trillions yen). Source: Japanese Ministry of
Finance.
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Party (LDP). While such parties tend to prefer low taxes, the conventional
wisdom is that right parties also prefer fiscal discipline, yet the LDP, which
ruled Japan with virtually no interruption from 1955 to 2009, presided over
Japan’s skyrocketing public debt and massive deficits.
Japan’s political institutions could plausibly account for Japan’s weak
extractive capacity. Under Japan’s electoral system until 1994 the single
non-transferrable vote (SNTV)
candidates from the same party were
forced to compete against each other. This intra-party competition created
factions and weakened the party and executive (Estevez-Abe, 2006;
Mulgan, 2002). While not discounting the general significance of the electoral system, a weak executive has not prevented tax hikes. The government, for instance, introduced a new consumption tax in 1989 and then
passed legislation in 1994 prior to electoral reform taking effect that
increased the tax in 1997. Under the new electoral system, Prime Minister
Hashimoto chose to implement the tax hike in 1997 (from the 1994 legislation), and then again in 2012, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) passed
legislation to gradually double the tax by 2015. The problem of extractive
capacity runs deeper, in the public resistance, both unorganized and organized, to such measures and the electoral backlashes even in the wake of
‘successful’ increases in taxes. Thus, the political consequences, actual and
anticipated, rather than the policy process, have been the real impediment
to increasing taxes.
Economic globalization, some have suggested, can weaken the ability of
states to tax. Greater capital mobility puts downward pressure on taxation
of capital, corporate income, and wealthy individuals (Genschel, 2002;
Gordon and Mackie-Mason, 1995; Razin and Sadka, 1991). In the case of
Japan, though, the government’s low tax burden, which dates back to the
end of World War II, predates the rise of greater economic integration.
Still, conceivably though, one could argue that the effects of globalization
and more intense tax competition have constrained Japan’s extractive
capacity since the 1980s as the state attempted to raise revenue. In fact,
there is evidence that this has been the case. As will be discussed in more
detail, the Japanese government did attempt to keep taxes in line with
other countries, most clearly the USA, as they lowered income and other
corporate taxes.
Still, the case of Japan does not conform neatly to the globalization and
tax competition argument. While such pressures should lead to lower corporate taxation and higher taxation of less mobile consumers, Japan relies
disproportionately on corporate taxes for revenue. Japan has the highest
corporate tax rates in the developed world, and compared with the USA,
which also has a high corporate tax, fewer deductions. Corporate tax revenue as a share of GDP in 2008 was the 7th highest out of 33 countries
(OECD, 2010), despite an overall low level of taxes as a share of GDP. By
contrast, Japan has one of the lowest levels of taxation of consumption of
all OECD countries (see Figures 2 4).
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Figure 2 Corporate tax rate (percentage), OECD countries, 2011. Source: OECD
Tax Database.
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Figure 3 Taxation on goods and services as a share of GDP, OECD countries,
2008. Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 2010, p. 90.

The Japanese government also has one of the highest top statutory personal income tax brackets in the OECD. The stickiness of Japan’s tax
structure is more in line with often-observed path dependence of tax policy
and domestic politics (Ganghof, 2007; Garrett and Mitchell, 2001; Swank,
2002). The heavy taxation of corporations and the relatively light taxation
of consumers and lower income households are also surprising given the
long-ruling LDP’s reputation as a party of big business and the weak
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Figure 4 Top statutory income tax rates, OECD countries, 2009. Source: OECD
Tax Database, Taxation of Wage Income.

position of labor in the country, which also suggests that the organization
of interests is an inadequate explanatory variable.

The tax welfare mix
Taxes are a source of revenue to finance public spending; indeed, this is
one of their central functions. Governments, though, can use tax policy not
only as revenue generators but also to achieve policy goals directly.
Beyond the use of tax policy as an economic instrument, taxes can serve
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not only as revenue for the welfare state but also as a functional substitute
for social spending. Howard (1997) and others have shown how tax expenditures in the USA form part of a hidden welfare state, creating incentives
for the private provision of welfare and targeting tax relief to specific
groups such as low-income workers through the earned income tax credit.
States may rely on taxes as revenue or as a constituent element of social
protection. We can imagine a continuum with states employing a variety of
tax welfare mixes. Whereas large welfare states may rely on taxes primarily as revenue, countries with smaller welfare states might supplement
social spending with a redistributive tax policy, as in the USA and Japan.
(While taxes can be redistributive, spending typically has greater redistributive effects.)

Japan’s tax welfare mix
In broad strokes, Japan’s tax welfare mix from the end of World War II
through the end of the 1960s can be described as having three components.
The first pillar was Japan’s formal welfare state. During this period, the
government created a national healthcare system and a mandatory universal pension in 1960, but welfare costs were deliberately limited. The public
pension was modest, and programs for the unemployed, childcare, and
other social services were minimal. The government encouraged the private provision of welfare through corporations and family (Pempel, 1998;
Verba, 1987). Thus, by 1960, of all the democracies in the OECD, Japan
had the lowest spending on welfare as a share of GDP.
The second pillar was the tax system. In addition to keeping aggregate
taxes low indeed the lowest of the OECD democracies in 1965 (OECD,
2010)1 Japan also implemented a progressive tax policy. Japan’s prewar
tax system relied to a high degree on regressive taxation of consumption.
After the war, the Japanese government used tax policy to relieve the tax
burden on groups viewed as more economically vulnerable; in fact the government viewed lowering taxes as a part of its system of social security.2
More specifically, the government created targeted and preferential tax
treatment to reduce the burden on groups viewed as being left behind by
Japan’s economic development, such as farmers and small business, also
the groups central to the ruling party’s social coalition (Akaishi, 2005). The
government also kept regressive indirect taxes on consumption to a minimum. As a result, in 1965, Japan had the lowest taxes on goods and services
in the entire OECD at 4.8% of GDP, one-half of the OECD average
(see Figure 5) (OECD, 2010).
The government also relieved the personal income tax burden on lower
income salaried workers. After World War II, the income tax weighed
heavily on these classes, a result of Occupation-era tax reform. To deliver
tax relief, the government increased the personal exemption and the
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Figure 5 Indirect taxation
taxation on goods and services as a share of GDP,
OECD countries. 1965. Source: OECD Tax Database.

dependent deduction, thereby raising the ‘minimum taxable income’, the
income threshold below which income tax is not levied. Thus, by the 1956,
Japan already had a high minimum taxable income that was 64% of the
average annual income; by comparison the figures for the USA, UK, and
Germany were 34.2%, 45.2%, and 50.3%, respectively (Zaimusho Zaimu
Sogo Seisaku Kenkyujo, 1999). In subsequent decades, the government
continued to increase the threshold rapidly (see Table 1), while also
increasing the tax rates of upper end brackets. With a high minimum
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Table 1 Minimum taxable income in Japan by household type (in thousands yen)

1950
1955
1960
1965
1970

Individual

Married couple

Married couple
with one child

Married couple
with two children

29
93
118
196
344

43
143
210
351
580

57
174
250
413
728

71
205
289
474
880

Source: Japanese Ministry of Finance.

taxable income, the personal income tax generated low levels of revenue,
despite its high top-end bracket rates.3 In 1965, revenue from Japan’s personal income tax was 3.9% of GDP, one of the lowest in the OECD and
less than half that of the USA at 7.8% (OECD, 2010).
The third pillar was redistributive public investment. The government
invested heavily in public works not only to provide valuable economic
infrastructure but also to redistribute resources to rural regions and to create employment (DeWit and Steinmo, 2002; Ide, 2011; Park, 2011). Such
spending was viewed as a deliberate alternative to the expansion of welfare
policies, which were viewed as too costly and thus kept minimal. Public
investment also had another advantage: it could be financed by an off-budget public finance system known as the Fiscal Investment Loan Program
(FILP). FILP was financed primarily by postal savings and eventually pension reserves, allowing the Japanese government to keep public investment
high and taxes low (Park, 2011).
Japan’s tax welfare mix its combination of minimal welfare spending,
low and preferential tax treatment, and redistributive public investment
was a reflection of the ruling party’s economic strategy. The Japanese government maintained a strict policy of low taxes, low budget expenditures
and balanced budgets after the end of World War II until the middle of the
1960s. This fiscal policy, originally a legacy of the US Occupation that
imposed fiscal austerity on Japan, became a vital element of the government’s larger growth strategy. Low taxes were intended to spur private
savings and investment, while balanced budgets would help control inflation and complement the government’s active use of monetary policy to
stimulate growth. The government maintained a ceiling on its budget
spending and aggregate tax burden of 20% of gross national income, and
through the mid-1960s maintained balanced budgets. The fiscal constraints
stemming from Japan’s economic growth strategy dictated its approach to
social protection. In contrast to governments that increased taxation and
spending, particularly on social programs, the Japanese Government deliberately kept formal welfare spending low. The government complemented
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its minimal welfare state with its redistributive tax policy and public investment (Park, 2011).
Japan’s mixture of low taxes, high public investment, and residual welfare policies was also the means by which the LDP used the public
finance system to stay in power. Both tax policy and high public investment targeted groups that were critical to the LDP’s social coalition: sole
proprietors, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), rural voters, and
farmers. Japan’s electoral system created incentives for the government
to deliver targeted redistributive benefits over broad programmatic welfare policies (Est
evez-Abe, 2008). Regular income tax cuts were also central to the conservatives’ approach to middle-class salaried urban
workers, a group that tended to have weaker partisan affiliations but
became increasingly pivotal as Japan urbanized.

Constraining extractive capacity
Through the middle of the 1960s, the Japanese government maintained
remarkable fiscal discipline even while keeping taxes low, in part due to
rapid growth but also through controlling expenditures using the particular
tax welfare mix described above. During this period, the government
chose to limit its extractive capacity. This situation changed by the latter
half of the 1960s, as the Japanese government faced its first deficits, which
then grew sharply during the 1970s as the government increased spending
on welfare and public works. From this period onward, the Japanese government faced challenges in raising additional revenue. While there have
been some notable successes (discussed further below), the tax welfare
mix constrained the revenue-raising potential of the Japanese state in several ways. Specifically, Japan’s tax welfare mix weakened its extractive
capacity through three mechanisms: politically narrowing the tax base, the
timing and sequencing of its tax policy and welfare development, and the
erosion of tax consent.

Politically narrowing the tax base
Relying more on targeted tax relief as part of its system of redistribution
and social protection effectively narrows the possibilities for broadening
the tax base, thereby weakening extractive capacity. The effect is largely a
political one. Once a social bargain around tax relief is struck, it can be
locked in politically through interest group pressure, norms, and party
competition. In effect, this narrows the tax base by increasing the political
hurdle of passing tax hikes that run counter to this redistributive compromise. Of course, a government can increase other taxes, but there are two
problems with this approach. First, tax hikes concentrated on a narrower
band of taxes can generate political backlash, as some groups are forced to
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bear the brunt of tax hikes. Second, increasing hikes on a narrow band of
taxes has limited revenue-raising potential.
Political lock-in of low taxes
As deficits and debt increased starting in the second half of the 1960s, the
government searched for new ways to raise revenue, but it was constrained
by the need to keep low and preferential tax treatment for groups at the
lower end of the economic hierarchy such as lower income-salaried households, small business, and farmers. Small business and farmers, beneficiaries of the government’s tax policy, were highly organized interest groups
and also constituencies critical to the support base of the LDP (Calder,
1988; Pempel, 1998). The ruling party largely refrained from even attempting to increase taxes on these groups. Official discussions of tax reform
within all of the main tax policy-making bodies the LDP’s Tax System
Research Council, the government’s Tax System Research Council, and
the Ministry of Finance’s Tax Bureau avoided discussion of increasing
their tax burden (Mizuno, 2006).
As the government looked to increase revenue, it might have turned to
the personal income tax. The income tax during the first decades after
World War II evolved into a significant source of revenue for industrialized
democracies. Inflation pushed incomes into higher personal income tax
brackets, so revenue grew without any tax rate hikes. By contrast, in Japan,
the government delivered regular tax cuts to keep the income tax burden
low for lower income households as part of its model of social protection.
The LDP always had trouble winning the support of urban salaried workers. As Japan urbanized, salaried workers with weaker partisan alignments
grew increasingly important for winning elections, so too did the imperative of keeping taxes low.
The government’s tax policy was more deeply rooted than the preferences of the ruling LDP: it was embedded within the party system. Opposition parties, including those to the left of the LDP, often called for
lowering taxes on these same groups. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP),
Clean Government Party (CGP), and the Democratic Socialist Party
(DSP) frequently advocated lowering taxes. Backbenchers within the LDP
and the LDP’s short-lived coalition partner
the New Liberal Club
(NLC) which had splintered from the LDP also pushed in some cases
for tax cuts larger than those proposed by the government. The equilibrium
around low taxes from the left and right exemplify how the tax welfare model locked-in preferences toward tax policy.
The LDP continued to deliver tax cuts even as spending and deficits
grew. To shore up dwindling support for the LDP, Prime Minister Tanaka
(1972 1974) delivered large tax cuts even while sharply increasing spending for welfare programs and public works. Before a general election in
1972, the LDP reached out to sole proprietors by promising to set up a
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system that would allow them to deduct wages from income. Tanaka
Kakuei then passed a 300 million yen cut in personal income taxes in 1973
and in 1974 a huge two trillion yen personal income tax cut (that lowered
rates and raised the minimum taxable income), a sum equivalent to a
whopping 12% of the budget (Mizuno, 2006).
Tanaka deliberately abandoned fiscal discipline, but even as the
Japanese government turned toward fiscal consolidation, the government
avoided tax hikes central to the fiscal bargain and in some cases, continued
to lower taxes. For the fiscal years from 1978 to 1980, the government
passed no significant income tax cuts, but came under intense criticism
from opposition parties for not doing so. Despite the ongoing budget pressure and Prime Minister Suzuki’s (1980 1982) commitment to fiscal consolidation, the government delivered an income tax cut and a tax cut for
small business in 1981. Opponents and the media labeled the income tax
cut derisively as the ‘ramen tax cut’ because it was just enough to buy a
cheap bowl of noodles. In the run up to elections in 1983, the LDP promised a much larger income tax cut, which Prime Minister Nakasone also
an avowed fiscal hawk committed to fiscal consolidation
delivered for
the 1984 fiscal year even though budget revenues would only cover 67% of
expenditures (Mizuno, 2006).

The limits of a narrow tax base
The government did raise taxes, but those peripheral to Japan’s tax welfare mix. In particular, the government raised taxes on corporations. Even
before the tax hikes, Japan’s corporate tax was its largest revenue generator. In 1965, only New Zealand generated more revenue as a share of GDP
of the OECD countries (OECD, 2010). Starting in the 1970s, the government began to increase corporate taxes steadily. In 1973, the Tanaka
administration actually raised corporate taxes to partially offset the historic
income tax cut that targeted the middle and lower middle class. After a
succession of corporate tax hikes and the closing of deductions throughout
the 1970s, the government passed a budget in 1981 that raised corporate
taxes again. Japan’s revenue from the taxation of corporate income as a
share of GDP in 1985 was the third highest in the OECD, and corporate
income taxation was 21% of all tax revenue, far higher than in any other
OECD country (OECD, 2010).
Japan’s heavy reliance on taxation of corporations may seem surprising
given the widespread image of the LDP as party aligned closely with big
business, but this was always only a partial description at best. While big
business supplied the party with contributions, the LDP always had to rely
on the support of groups large enough to deliver the vote, and its redistributive model reflected this need.
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The government’s approach to raising revenue also had two problems. First,
narrow and rapid tax hikes engendered political backlash. Starting in the late
1970s, big business mobilized opposition through their business organizations,
Keidanren and Keizai Doyukai. Big business argued that high corporate tax
rates hurt competitiveness, an argument that gained traction as other countries
began to lower corporate taxes. Big business also became more interested in
tax reform, hoping to shift the tax structure in such a way that corporations
would not bear the burden of future tax rises (Kimura, 2011).
The second limitation was that because the tax hikes were so narrow, they
could not generate enough revenue to cover growing expenditures, a problem exacerbated by the fact that they were at times paired with income tax
cuts. The government hiked corporate taxes, closed corporate income tax
loopholes, and also raised very narrow indirect taxes, but this approach
reached its revenue-generating limits. By the 1970s, the government began
to look at ways to broaden its tax base, more specifically implementing a
valued added tax (VAT), a move that big business supported as a way to
limit its own tax burden. Issues of timing and sequencing as well as weak
tax consent, however, have hampered the process of transition to the VAT.

Timing and sequencing of tax policy and welfare development
As a growing body of literature has shown, timing and sequencing matter
(Pierson, 2004), and those working in the vein of the “new fiscal sociology”
have explicitly called for more attention to these processes (Martin,
Mehrotra and Prasad, 2009). Both decisively influenced Japan’s extractive
capacity. First, the Japanese government missed the window of raising
taxes during an era of easy finance. Second, Japan began to raise taxes
from a very low base at an inauspicious time: during a period of deficits
and scarcity and as global economic integration, tax competition, and neoliberalism put downward pressure on the taxes that the Japanese government was most reliant on. Third, the timing and sequence of Japan’s
welfare expansion and tax policy impeded Japan’s shift to a new tax structure that relied on greater indirect taxation.
Missing the era of easy finance
Japan’s tax policy during the first decades after World War II through the
end of the 1960s had a decisive impact on its long-term extractive capacity.
By deciding to limit tax burden and return natural revenue increases to citizens and business in the form of tax cuts, the Japanese government effectively missed an opportune moment to increase revenues. After World
War II, through the start of the 1970s, the global economy was buoyant,
and Japan’s economy grew at unprecedented rates. During this period, the
Japanese government conceivably could have done nothing more than let
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growth and inflation generate higher levels of revenue without raising
taxes. The additional revenue would have allowed it to finance higher levels of spending on welfare and other programs. In the USA, tax revenues,
driven significantly by the income tax, rose with relatively little political
opposition during the ‘era of easy finance’ (Brownlee, 2004). Inflation
pushed people into higher income tax brackets, and the government kept
the personal exemption low, effectively broadening the tax base as the
income tax captured an ever-larger share of the population. Thus, the government was able to increase its tax burden not only without tax hikes but
also in spite of tax cuts under Kennedy and Johnson. Japan, by contrast,
deliberately kept its aggregate tax burden low, delivering popular tax cuts.
Thus, Japan entered a period of relative fiscal scarcity and slower growth
with a tax burden significantly lower than most other industrialized democracies. In 1975, Japan’s tax burden was 20.8% of GDP (the OECD average
was 29.4%); by contrast in the low-spending USA, the tax burden was
25.6% of GDP (OECD, 2010).
Downward pressures on taxation: globalization and tax competition
Low taxes not only became entrenched politically, but the timing of the
government’s attempt to increase revenue was an inauspicious one. First,
during the 1970s, the global economy experienced two oil shocks and then
Japan’s rate of growth, while still comparatively high, slowed during the
1980s. Second, increased global economic integration, tax competition, and
the diffusion of neoliberal supply-side economic ideas all created downward pressure on taxes. This aspect of Japan’s timing was particularly troublesome for the Japanese government because of its heavy reliance on a
highly progressive income tax and high corporate tax rates, the two taxes
that faced the most downward pressure.
Just as the Japanese government embarked on fiscal consolidation starting in the early 1980s, the government came under increasing pressure to
lower income tax progressivity and corporate tax rates. To compensate for
the revenue loss from cuts to two key sources of revenue, the Japanese government shifted toward the idea of introducing a broad consumption tax.
Many European countries embraced the VAT, and in Japan Prime Minister Ohira had unsuccessfully tried to introduce one at the end of the 1970s.
Big business embraced the idea of a consumption tax, hoping that the consumption tax could help finance a reduction in corporate tax rates (Kimura,
2011). Prime Minister Nakasone (1982 1987) attempted to bring these two
strands reducing tax progressivity and corporate taxes and introducing a
regressive tax on consumption together in a comprehensive tax reform.
Nakasone succeeded with the first part. He lowered the corporate tax rate,
reduced the number of personal income tax brackets, and brought down
the highest marginal rate from 60% to 50%. The attempt to introduce a

G. Park and E. Ide: The Tax-Welfare Mix

691

consumption tax, however, failed; a development discussed in more
detail below.
By the time Nakasone passed his tax reform, the effects of globalization,
tax competition, and neoliberalism were being felt around the world, as
governments reduced income tax progressivity and lowered corporate tax
rates. After having increased consistently since the end of World War II,
the growth in the aggregate level of tax burden across the OECD largely
remained steady from the 1980s, including in Japan.
Timing of welfare state development and tax policy
The sequencing of Japan’s welfare state development and tax policy also
weakened Japan’s extractive capacity. Although Nakasone reduced its corporate tax rate and income tax progressivity, the government could have
raised other taxes. In fact, Nakasone had tried to introduce a VAT. As
powerful generators of revenue, a VAT would have enhanced the government’s revenue capacity. Indeed the Ministry of Finance calculated that
a 1% consumption tax, similar to a VAT, would have generated more revenue than all of Japan’s indirect taxes in the early 1970s. Given the administrative burden, the Ministry of Finance advocated introducing a 5% VAT
(Mizuno, 2006).
The government’s deferment of welfare expansion and the use of tax
policy as an element of its model of social protection hindered its efforts to
introduce and raise a broad consumption tax. Until the early 1970s, the tax
system was geared toward redistributing income in combination with its
residual welfare state and high public investment. Consequently, a regressive tax like the VAT was particularly anathema to Japan’s social bargain.
Opposition to regressive indirect taxation ran deeply within the LDP, the
Ministry of Finance’s Tax Bureau, experts, the media, and population
(Mizuno, 2006). Although the need for revenue eventually shifted the preferences of the LDP leadership and MOF, widespread opposition remained.
The consumption tax and other versions of it were widely unpopular, and
powerful interests, particularly retailers and small business, on whose support the LDP relied, actively mobilized to defeat it. The opposition parties,
in particular the Socialists, were also avowed opponents to any tax on consumption, and at key moments, exploited the widespread unpopularity of
the tax to their political advantage.
In virtually any context, the introduction or increase of a tax on consumption poses a profound political challenge. One means of demobilizing
at least part of the opposition would have been to blunt the regressive
effect through an expansion of the welfare state that redistributed income
on the expenditure side. In many large welfare states, such as Sweden and
France, governments have had much more success in increasing the regressive VAT as a means to finance redistributive welfare spending. In Japan,
however, welfare expansion was largely delayed until the early 1970s.
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When Prime Minister Tanaka moved to upgrade the nation’s social policies, he paired expenditure hikes with large tax cuts as discussed earlier, a
maneuver that sowed the seeds of ongoing fiscal problems and made the
welfare state vulnerable to fiscal retrenchment.
Starting during the second-half of the 1970s, the government began to
consider the use of a broad indirect tax as a means to pay for enhanced welfare. However, by the time the government started to plan for a possible
tax hike the revenue was needed to close deficits not finance expand welfare, and in fact, starting in the 1980s, the welfare state experienced significant retrenchment. In 1982, the government abolished free medical care
for the elderly, and in 1994, the pension eligibility age was raised from 60
to 65 years. More recently, there have been numerous proposals to link
hikes in the consumption tax to welfare spending. The proposed tax hikes,
however, are not to expand welfare programs but to reassure the public
that funds will not be misused or wasted on pork barrel spending, an
important point returned to below.
Despite these very high hurdles, LDP-controlled administrations persistently pursued the introduction of a consumption tax from the mid-1970s,
and to some extent, they succeeded. A 3% consumption tax was eventually
introduced in 1989, and then hiked to 5% in 1997. However, overall, the
transition to indirect transition has been very slow and marked 0 by
repeated defeats from the late 1970s until 1989. Even with the introduction
and then hike of the consumption tax, compared to other OECD countries,
Japan’s VAT is quite low (see Figure 6).4 More critically, these successes
belie the political lesson learned from these events, namely that the consumption tax has a very high political cost. The first failed attempt led to a
loss of its majority for the ruling party; the successful introduction of the
VAT also played a key role in the LDP’s loss of its majority in the Upper
House and subsequent resignation of Prime Minister Takeshita; the hike
of the consumption tax in 1997 was blamed for pushing the economy back
into recession and contributed to the loss of control of the Upper House
and the resignation of Prime Minister Hashimoto.
The DPJ has had similar experiences. Once in power, the mere mention of
a consumption tax hike contributed to a rout in elections that led to loss of
control of the Upper House in 2010. The loss gave momentum to an insurgency against Prime Minister Kan Naoto, leading to his resignation. The new
prime minister, Noda Yoshihiko, however, persevered, and in the summer of
2012, the government passed a landmark hike in the consumption tax. The
law will raise the consumption tax from 5% to 8% in 2014 and then 10% in
2015. However, the debate over the tax proved to be so divisive, that the DPJ
has had 70 members of the party leave over the issue. As the government
pushed through the tax and then passed it, the cabinet approval ratings
dropped from over 65% to 19%.5 The DPJ then lost in a landslide in December of 2012 going from 230 to 57 (of 480) seats in the House of Representatives. Moreover, to pass the law, the government included a provision that
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Figure 6 VAT rates (percentage), OECD countries, 2011. Source: OECD Tax
Database.

will allow it to suspend the tax hike if the economy is still weak. The current
Abe administration has committed to further fiscal stimulus, including passing
a five trillion yen supplementary budget to be financed by borrowing. It has
not yet, however, made a decision about the scheduled tax rise.
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Figure 7 The employees’ pension insurance contribution rate (percentage of wage;
rate includes employee and employer contributions). Source: http://www.anshinrougo.com/shiryou.html#02.

Both successes and failures with tax hikes for both the LDP and DPJ
have reinforced the lesson that the consumption tax is the third rail in Japanese politics, something that politicians across party lines will continue to
take to heart.
While Japan’s delayed welfare state has weakened its extractive capacity,
welfare state development itself has, as in other countries, facilitated raising
revenue. Indeed, increased social insurance contributions have been the
primary means by which the Japanese government has raised revenue. The
government has steadily increased social insurance contributions Figure 7
shows the trend in social insurance contributions for the Employee’s Pension Insurance system, the second tier of Japan’s pension system. Social
security contributions in 2008 accounted for 38.6% of tax revenue, up from
21.8% in 1965 (Miyamoto, 2008).
The Japanese government’s ability to raise rates so rapidly is in many
ways remarkable. The hikes corresponded with a period of heightened tax
competition, welfare retrenchment during the 1980s and early 1990s, and
also periods of sharp economic downturn during Japan’s lost decade.
Furthermore, social security contributions are much more regressive than
the personal income tax, with no exemptions for salaried workers and a
cap on contributions for high-income workers. Social insurance contributions, though, are the exception that proves the rule. The tight link between
payments and benefits make social insurance contributions one of the most
politically palatable ways to raise revenue (Campbell, forthcoming), and
exemplify how welfare can enhance the extractive capacity of the state.
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Yet, while the government has in fact used social insurance to generate
revenue, these hikes have not been able to offset revenue gap. There are
also limits to social security contribution increases. Social insurance hikes
raise the cost of labor, which can increase unemployment and the shadow
economy (Campbell, forthcoming). To avoid reducing the incentive to hire
workers, the government is attempting to curb the growth of social insurance contributions by shifting the burden of paying for public pensions
away from social contributions and back to general revenue.

Undermining tax consent
The ability of a government to raise revenue from its population depends,
in part, on the consent of taxpayers to pay (Levi, 1988; Martin Mehrotra
and Prasad, 2009). The policies and actions of a government can both
enhance or undermine the perceived legitimacy of its demands for revenue.
Japan’s tax welfare mix had the unintended consequence of undermining
its extractive capacity in two ways. First, preferential tax treatment eventually created the perception that Japan’s tax system was not fair. Second,
the use of high public investment, which helped transfer resources and create jobs in stagnant, often rural areas, fed a perception of waste. Both
undermined trust in government, making it harder to justify tax increases.
The first effect is directly related to the government’s use of tax cuts and
preferential tax treatment as a form of social protection. As described earlier, sole proprietors, SMES, and farmers were taxed lightly. The light taxation of these groups was partly a function of low rates, targeted tax
expenditures (such as exemptions or deductions), but also partly a function
of weak enforcement, which in itself was the result of deliberate political
decisions to shelter these groups. Salaried workers (or what the Japanese
call ‘salarymen’), by contrast, are taxed at the source and as a result, tax
compliance is high, and additionally they have few opportunities to deduct
expenses. Salaried workers, thus, have borne a disproportionate share of
the tax burden. Indeed, the unevenness of the tax burden is captured by
the expression ‘9 6 4’ which emerged in the 1970s to capture the view
that the government captures 90% of the taxes salaried workers owe, but
only 60% for sole proprietors and 40% for farmers.6 As the government’s
personal income tax cuts became less frequent, the rising burden on salaried workers sharpened discontent with the tax system during the 1980s
(Ide and Steinmo, 2009). While the reality is that most salaried workers’
income particularly for the lower and middle-class is taxed lightly, the
view that salaried workers unfairly bear an inordinate amount of the burden has heightened resistance to higher income taxes as well as the consumption tax.
The government’s reliance on high public investment to redistribute
resources and create jobs also has eroded tax consent by creating the
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perception of widespread government waste. This form of economic redistribution complemented its socially oriented tax policy and residual welfare state, and as discussed earlier, public investment was viewed as a way
to avoid the expansion of costly welfare policies. Under political pressure
in the 1970s, the Japanese government expanded public works spending
while also increasing welfare spending. Through the latter half of the 1970s
and 1980s, public investment rose steadily, in part because the government
found it increasingly difficult to deliver regular tax cuts (Ide and Steinmo,
2009). During the first part of the 1990s, the government sharply increased
public investment to stimulate the economy and while below the peak of
the middle of the decade, public investment remained high for the rest of
Japan’s ‘lost decade’.
The perception of wasteful spending7 has created a political bias that
favors cutting spending as opposed to opting for tax hikes to raise revenue.
Indeed, an international poll from 2006 shows that in comparative terms,
there is particularly strong sentiment that government spending should be
reduced (see Table 2).
Pursuing fiscal consolidation through controlling expenditures was codified in the political slogan ‘fiscal reconstruction without tax hikes’ that
emerged in the 1980s. The slogan grew out of the debate to first introduce
a broad consumption tax. Opposition and minority parties, exploiting
the unpopularity of the tax, argued that rather than introducing a new tax
the government should focus on reducing waste and improving administrative efficiency. At the end of 1979, opposition parties called for a nonbinding resolution on fiscal consolidation in the Upper House that opposed
the future introduction of a consumption tax. The Socialists were the first
do so, and eventually their resolution passed, but other parties introduced
similar resolutions.8 The Socialist Party resolution stated that the consumption tax had not been adequately debated and that fiscal consolidation
should focus on cutting expenditures, increasing administrative efficiency
and making the tax system fairer (Ide, 2011). Under pressure, the LDP and
Suzuki administration then embraced the formula, launching an administrative reform focused on fiscal consolidation through spending control and
greater efficiency (and that abandoned the introduction of the consumption
tax).
‘Fiscal reconstruction without taxes’ has been an enduring formula. Following the Suzuki administration, Prime Minister Nakasone (1982 1985)
took up the slogan, and succeeded in restoring a degree of fiscal discipline.
Prime Minister Takeshita (1987 1989) and later Hashimoto (1996 1998)
departed from the formula by introducing and raising the VAT respectively, but their experiences, if anything, reinforced the political wisdom of
focusing on expenditure side reforms. In his term, as prime minister in the
first part of new century, Koizumi (2001 2006), aware of the public resistance to tax increases and concern over wasteful spending, continued to
focus on expenditure side cuts to reduce deficits. In fact, he explicitly
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Table 2 Public opinion on expenditure cuts, 2006. ‘Here are some things the
government might do for the economy. Please show which actions you are in favor
of and which you are against. Cuts in government spending?’
Country
France
Poland
Japan
Germany-West
Germany-East
Portugal
Canada
New Zealand
United States
Norway
Taiwan
Netherlands
Sweden
Denmark
South Korea
Ireland
Australia
Spain
Great Britain
Switzerland
Finland

Strongly in favor of

In favor of

67.7
57.7
57.3
46.5
42.6
39
36.8
28.1
27.6
26.2
23.2
22.6
20.4
19.1
17.6
17.1
17.1
13.2
11.8
9.9
6.8

20.7
29.7
22.5
30.1
32.1
45
31.8
34.9
35.7
35.1
45.6
44
35.4
26
37.7
25.6
27.2
42.8
26.3
34.3
22.8

Source: International Social Survey Programme, ‘Role of Government, Part IV’, 2006.

revived and re-popularized ‘fiscal reconstruction without tax hikes’ and
promised that he would not raise the consumption tax during his administration. In office, he focused on aggressive administrative reforms and cuts
to public works spending, as part of a longer term strategy to win back public trust and prepare the ground for future tax hikes under a future administration. The MOF and LDP also floated various proposals, ones met
skeptically by the public, to dedicate revenue from any tax hike to welfare
spending so that voters would be reassured that revenue would not be
wasted but would instead flow to worthy ends.
Initially the DPJ, which ended the LDP’s long rule in 2009, largely kept
to the same course. Prime Minister Hatoyama promised not to raise the
consumption tax during his tenure, exactly as Koizumi had. The DPJ also
committed to lower the still comparatively high corporate tax rate, while at
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the same time also increasing welfare spending with the introduction of a
child allowance. Much like the LDP, the government sidestepped taxes
and promised to restore fiscal balance by freeing up revenue through
reducing waste. Upon taking power, the government set up a new Government Revitalization Unit (GRU) in the Cabinet Office to review public
spending. The GRU, whose proceedings were streamed on the web, initially proved popular and won approval in the media, although the actual
savings were very limited, underscoring the limits to the DPJ’s approach to
revenue (Park, 2010).
Since Hatoyama stepped down in 2010, as discussed earlier, the DPJ’s
approach to taxes shifted. In the summer of 2012, the government passed a
tax hike that will raise the consumption tax incrementally from 5% to 10%
by 2015. The government’s determination on this issue is related to the scale
of the Japan’s fiscal problem, which is now reaching crisis proportion as
Japan’s population aging accelerates. Furthermore, the deficit and sovereign
debt problems in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have created a perception that the government must act, a sentiment that the government has
encouraged to help make future tax increases seem inevitable. Still, the tax
hike has been a very difficult sell. As mentioned earlier, the DPJ faced large
defections, the cabinet approval rate fell dramatically below 20%, and then
the party suffered a resounding defeat leading to a loss of power.

Conclusion
Analyzing the case of Japan, this article offers a new theory of extractive
capacity. While the expansion of the welfare state has contributed to the revenue-raising capacity of the state, including in Japan, this view overlooks the
variety of ways that states can integrate social and tax policy, i.e., the
tax welfare mix. Governments not only use taxes for revenue but also more
directly as a means to achieve redistributive goals. How states do so, this
paper shows, has long-term consequences for a state’s extractive capacity.
The tax welfare mix also helps explain a number of seeming peculiarities
of the Japanese case. Despite having long rule by a center-right party that
has relied on financial support from big business, the Japanese state has
relied heavily on the taxation of corporations while keeping regressive taxation of consumption relatively low and tax treatment of low- and middleincome workers light. Moreover, Japan’s tax structure, while clearly influenced by globalization, has not conformed to the globalization thesis. Tax
competition and globalization create pressures to shift taxes away from
mobile assets, such as corporate profits, to immobile assets (e.g., consumption), but comparatively Japan has one of the highest levels of reliance on
corporate taxation and lowest levels of indirect taxation of consumption.
This pattern only makes sense by understanding how the government has
used redistributive tax policy as part of its system of social policy.
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The tax welfare argument also suggests an alternative explanation that
goes beyond Japan’s electoral rules. While Japan’s old SNTV electoral system created incentives for particularistic spending and weakened the executive, Japan’s weak extractive capacity is rooted more deeply in key
historical choices about its tax and welfare policy. The dilemmas created
by this historical legacy are likely to persist despite Japan’s transition to a
new electoral system in 1994. This finding underscores the utility of an historical institutionalist approach, which others such as Krauss and Pekkanen
(2011) have applied to better illuminate Japanese politics.
Finally, the argument presented here helps us rethink the capitalist
developmental state. As this paper shows, there is a problem in inferring
a high degree of state autonomy from low levels of social spending. As
the tax welfare mix argument suggests, low spending does not mean a
disregard for social policy or elite insulation from political pressure.
The government was in reality highly responsive to political demands; it
simply relied on a different tax welfare mix that employed tax policy
and targeted public investment. Thus, while in some ways low
spending followed state goals, it also masked the political-redistributive
logic of taxation that explains the Japanese state’s weakness on the
revenue side.
The case of Japan also suggests the need for greater attention to regime
type and the timing of industrialization and social policy. Unlike Taiwan or
South Korea through the early 1980s, postwar Japan was a democratic
regime that faced political pressure while it pursued rapid industrialization.
It was these competing tensions that contributed to Japan’s particular
tax welfare mix. By contrast, Taiwan and South Korea industrialized
under authoritarian regimes and then expanded the welfare state after
democratization. More empirical work across these cases is needed, but
the comparison of tax welfare mixes suggests a potentially fruitful
research avenue in explaining divergent fiscal outcomes. Given that Northeast Asian nations will face similar demographic changes that will strain
their social welfare and budget systems, understanding how the ‘East Asian
welfare model’ might influence the extractive capacity of states is an issue
worthy of further study.

Notes
1. As measured by taxes (including social security contributions) as a share of GDP.
2. In fact, the government highlighted low taxes as part of social security in economic planning deliberations. See Park (2011) for details.
3. In 1975, Japan’s top marginal personal income tax bracket was the fifth highest
of the 22 OECD countries for which there is data. Only Sweden, the UK, and
Ireland were higher.
4. The European Union has been an important driver of the diffusion and reliance
on VAT in Europe.
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5. Approval rate of the cabinet falls to record 19%. The Yomiuri Shimbun [online]
(November 6, 2012) Available at: http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T12110
5003365.htm Accessed [November 8, 2012].
6. The ratio has changed recently to 100-50-30-10, with the final number representing the percentage of the total income of politicians that is known by the tax
authorities.
7. Public perceptions have been fed in part by high levels of fixed public investment, but whether such spending is wasteful or not is a subjective perception.
Widespread media accounts have fed this perception with stories of wasteful
public works projects. This perception continues with stories of the misuse of
public funds in the rebuilding of the Tohoku region after the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear crisis.
8. Others include: the Clean Government Party (CGP), Kokumin Kaigi, Kokumin
Rengo, Japan Communist Party, and Kakushi Kyodo.
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